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In this paper we have shown that the relationship between Savings and Investment has 
varied across time, thus implying changes on capital mobility in different periods. Moreover, 
we have shown that the International Monetary and Financial System (IMFS) of different 
periods have different impacts on capital mobility and financial crises, depending on the nature 
of it. Using the idea of the Global Saving Glut by Bernanke (2005) and the Basco’s (2014) 
OLG model that includes bubble, we have shown that international capital mobility has played 
a significant role in the formation of the bubble in the Great Recession (1920’s) and the Great 
Recessions (2008). 
 
 Finally, we have also shown that the crises of both Grand Financial Crises were quite 
similar, or, at least in the causes of it. Foreign capital exploited the financial weaknesses and 
help to extend the crises across borders and in some cases the glut of capital created financial 
bubbles. In both cases an excess of capital and an exhaustion of “good investments”, as I 
defined for those investments that expands the production capability of an economy, help to 


























The Truth is written by the victors, this saying is very well known in popular culture 
and at the end it reflects the mistrust of the general population on the written history. The same 
can be said with financial crises, especially when it is painful and long. Usually the people in 
the top, the establishment, defends the current system by saying that the cause of the crisis was 
due to some greedy investors, some bad apples in the nest that profit from the weakness of the 
system. However, what if the whole fruit shop is rooted, not just a “couple of it”.? So, the 
financial crisis is in the DNA of the current system. 
This paper will use circumstantial evidence and if possible, use direct evidence to indict Capital 
Mobility as one, if not, the cause of the formation of financial bubbles and the subsequential 
painful aftermath of the burst of it. 
 
The first part of this work will use Feldstein and Horioka puzzle to test the history of 
the capital mobility and we will try to create a link between the mobility degree and the 
International Monetary and Financial System. So basically, compare the capital mobility with 
the Gold System periods, the Bretton Wood and the current IMFS. At the end, this part will 
infer the role of the IMFS in capital mobility and the frequencies of the crises (The question 
that we should answer in the end is if IMFS has a direct role on the frequencies of the crisis 
through capital mobility). 
 
The second part we will formalize the Global Saving Glut hypothesis and explain the 
financial crisis of 1929 and 2007/8. We will use an OLG model with the possibility of bubble 
formation to try to explain theoretically how capital mobility (in one direction) might have 
contributed to the formation of the crisis. Finally, we will use empirical data to show that capital 
mobility has or has not played a role. 
 
This paper takes inspiration from the due process of the judiciary system, you are 
innocent until proven the contrary. This paper will show that excess capital can and will create 
financial crises and if this excess capital goes unidirectionally to a or some countries then it 





CAPITAL MOBILITY THROUGHOUT HISTORY: A FELDSTEIN AND HORIOKA 
PUZZLE APPROACH 
 
The national accounts state that in a closed economy savings (S) is fully transferred to 
investment (I). Thus, this model implies a causal relationship between savings and investment, 
if the first one increases then the latter must also increase. In contrast, in an open economy, the 
relationship is not necessarily a causal relationship, which means that if saving rates increase 
then the investment might not increase at the same rate. By the same token, if savings rates 
decrease then foreign sector might compensate for it.  
 
The difference between closed and open economy can be shown easily in the classical 
macroeconomic saving-investment identity. 
 
In a closed economy, the basic national 
identity is as follows.  
 
𝐺𝑁𝑃 = 𝑌 = 𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝐺 
 
Notice that C denotes for consumption, I 
denote for Investment and G for public 
spending. 
If we add T that denotes government taxes 
and isolate I then we will have the 
following equation. 
(𝑌 − 𝐶 − 𝑇) + (𝑇 − 𝐺) = 𝐼 
𝑆 = 𝐼 
The first part (𝑌 − 𝐶 − 𝑇) denotes for 
private savings and the second part  
(𝑇 − 𝐺) denotes for public savings, the sum 
of both savings (S) must be equal to the 
investment. This means that if savings 
increases then investment must increase at 
the same rate, which is a casual 
relationship. 
In an open economy in contrast, we must 
add the foreign sector. 
 
𝐺𝑁𝑃 = 𝑌 = 𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝐺 − 𝑁𝑋 
 
NX represents the difference between 
exports and imports, the foreign sector. 
 
If we do the same step as in the closed 
economy model, we will have the 
following. 
(𝑌 − 𝐶 − 𝑇) + (𝑇 − 𝐺) = 𝐼 − 𝑁𝑋 
𝑆 = 𝐼 − 𝑁𝑋 
In the open economy model, the increase in 
savings might not translate to an increase of 
investment. The foreign sector plays a role. 
There is no causal relationship in this case, 
and it implies that savings move across 
countries (Capital Mobility). 
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In the case of an open economy, the intensity of capital mobility has not remained 
constant. The movement of capital has swung between periods of openness and periods of 
constraint. The conventional wisdom suggests that before WWI the international market was 
somewhat integrated under the Gold Standard System centered in London then after the Great 
Depression there was a period of disintegration and “a process of autarky” and not until the 
70’s the mobility recover. 
 
The problem is that there is no consensus on how to measure capital mobility. There is 
a need to test and check the veracity of the conventional idea.  
 
 There are two leading criteria or approaches; the first one is based on price, which 
consist of comparing the expected yield of certain assets across countries. The second one is 
based on quantity, which consists of comparing the savings and investment relationship across 
countries. This paper will use the latter because price criteria need intensive data requirement, 
it is necessary to use identical assets at different markets, and in practice, there might not be 
the data for all the periods and/or markets. The second criteria do bear a certain economic 
theory (Taylor, 1996) and substantial studies use the quantity method. One of these studies is 
the Feldstein and Horioka puzzle, the FH test consists of assessing whether an increase in 
savings might be retained at the home country or go at the international level, the premise of 
the work is that the correlation between savings and investment might be a thermometer to 
measure the degree of capital mobility. The original study used data from the 1960s to the 70s 
and it found that the relationship between investment and savings in developed countries were 
quite high, closed to unity (no capital mobility) however the original study was just a snapshot 
of the ‘60s and ‘70s and might not tell the full historical picture, moreover, the results from the 
original study might not correspond to the current situation or the situation of the early ’20s. 
This paper will extend the model from 1870 to 2016 to observe significant changes in capital 
movement across different periods, not just a single period like the Feldstein and Horioka work.  
The extension of the model is inspired by the work of Alan M. Taylor1 but the data2 that this 
paper uses is different. 
 
1 Taylor, Alan M., International Capital Mobility in History: The Saving-Investment Relationship (September 
1996). NBER Working Paper No. w5743. 
 
2 The paper of Alan M. Taylor uses 12 countries and ranges from 1850 to 1992. This paper will use 16 OECD 
countries and ranges from 1870 to 2016; the data source of this study is from http://www.macrohistory.net/data/  
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The model is a classical Ordinary Least Square (OLS) with a cross sectional analysis, 
although the data looks like a panel data3. This paper will analyze using cross-sectional 
analysis. The different sets of countries are grouped at different periods, so for a certain period, 
this paper will do a regression line for the set period and observe the results.  
There are 2 analyses; the first one is an average of 5 years periods, to observe the long-term 
evolution of the beta and then a yearly base model that corresponds to the short-term fluctuation 
that can be useful to observe the effect of policies exogenous shocks or changes on the 
international environment. 
 
Long Term Model (5 years average)4         (𝐼 𝑌⁄ )𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑎
𝐹𝐻 + 𝑏𝐹𝐻   (𝑆 𝑌⁄ )𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝑢𝑖 
                               
Short Term Model (Yearly basis) 5            (𝐼 𝑌⁄ )𝑖 = 𝑎
𝑆𝑛 + 𝑏𝑆𝑛(𝑆 𝑌⁄ )𝑖   + 𝑢𝑖                       
 
Despite the widespread use of the FH model, it has 2 problems as noted by Obstfeld 
(1994), the first handicap: Do the regression measure true and unbiased saving-investment 
retention? There might be a problem of omitted variables and several studies have shown that 
different factors can alter the attractiveness of a country to be invested or change the pattern of 
savings. As a result, the simple cross sectional FH test might end up with a spurious 
relationship and biased estimation. Furthermore, in the long run permanent investment must be 
equal to permanent savings plus a constant, in this context, if we average the periods long 
enough then we might estimate the intertemporal identity. Sinn (1992) proposed a cross-
sectional analysis yearly to avoid the problem. 
 
The second handicap: Even if the results are unbiased, what do the betas mean? How 
can we tell if capital mobility is high, what is the “golden rule” to consider high or low capital 
mobility? There is no prior basis to tell how big is big and how small is small, but one possible 
solution is to interpret the variation of beta across time, let’s say that if the beta in a 𝜏 period is 
1 ( which means savings are equal to investment and therefore low capital mobility), and the 
following period is 0.5 then we can tell that the 𝜏 + 1 period has more flexible capital mobility 
 
3 There are 16 identities and 146-time observation (1870-2016) 
 
4 The Long-Term Model is based on Taylor (1996) 
 
5 The Short-Term Model is based on Sinn (1992) 
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policies and therefore capital moves across borders easily, moreover if we observe that 𝜏 +
2 has an even lower beta we can conclude that there is a change in periods ( From low mobility 
to High mobility). Thus, this paper will take the conservative approach and the only indicator 
to tell if capital mobility is high or low is with a meaningful variation of beta across time. The 
falling beta will mean high capital mobility and increasing beta will mean low capital mobility 
(or more difficult to move capital across borders). 
 
Model 1: The results of the FH tests in the long run and the short run 
 
The results of the FH test in the long run and the short run, Font: Taylor (1996), Sinn (1992) and Jordà et al. 
(2016), Source: Own Made  
 
On the left-hand side (L), there is the long term (5 years averages) and on the right-
hand side (R), there is the yearly base model, the short term. 
 
The story might be told as follow, according to the results of the (L), in the 1880s capital 
mobility remain high (falling 𝑏𝐹𝐻) because the international powers were in a frenzy for 
foreign investment, especially the British Empire. Then in the 1890’s there is a restriction on 
capital movement, partially caused by the 1890’s crashes ( Increasing 𝑏𝐹𝐻), by the turn of the 
20th century, the international capital movement seems to recover (falling 𝑏𝐹𝐻) in a last foreign 
investment boom by the European empires, then the WWI came and ended the period of 
financial mobility ( Increasing 𝑏𝐹𝐻)but during the roaring 20’s there was a brief window of 
capital liberty ( falling 𝑏𝐹𝐻) but quickly change the slope in 1929 with the Great Depression 
(increasing 𝑏𝐹𝐻). Afterward, in the ’30s onwards there was more restrictive capital movement. 
By the ’40s and with the second World War, it seems that the capital mobility is increasing 
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(falling 𝑏𝐹𝐻), however, if we look at the data set, we observed that several countries lack data6 
The only reliable source of data came from the UK and the US and during that period there 
was a significant transfer of capital from the US to the UK due to the policies of the FDR7 
administration, mainly due to the Lend-Lease . In contrast to the interwar period, the 50’s to 
the ’70s, capital mobility was relatively low (increasing 𝑏𝐹𝐻)In the ’60s there was a brief easing 
of capital restriction, but it was short-lived.  From the ’70s to the 2010’s, capital mobility 
increases (falling 𝑏𝐹𝐻) due to the neoliberal policies of free trade and small government, this 
period lasted about 2008/9 with the Great Recession and capital mobility seems to be more 
restrictive (increasing 𝑏𝐹𝐻)but still not as the same level as in the ’50s or ’70s. 
 
The result might be helpful to discover the role of the international capital movement 
in the Great Depression and the Great Recession. If the role of the international capital 
movement is significant, we might see that before the crisis we might observe falling b and 
after the crisis, we might see increasing beta, the intuition is during economic booms with open 
economies foreign capital surges will expand the credit cycle (economic growth and even asset 
bubbles), when the economy collapses global capital market stops or dry up and thus capital 
movement is reduced. 
 
Moreover, during economic turmoil, countries that tend to have current account (CA) 
deficit usually get a sharp reversal from deficit to surplus (or at least reduce the deficit, which 
is the case of the United States), hence the balance of payment identity implies that if CA 
decreases, it will have an impact either on the capital account (KA)8 or the financial account 
(FA)9, with the same token, the contrary will happen in economic booms. 
 
Saving-Investment Identity                𝑆 − 𝐼 = 𝑁𝑋 = 𝐶𝐴 
 
 
6 Important world players miss, especially in the continental Europe like France, Germany or Italy 
 
7 Franklin D. Roosevelt policy: The Arsenal of the democracy, consited that the United States should provide 
supplies to the countries fighting Nazi Germnay, manily it refers to UK. It was a policy that was implemented 
before the U.S entrance into the war. 
8 The Current Account (CA) refers to investment in the economic sector like portfolio investment, foreign direct 
investment. 
 
9 The Financial account (KA) is the difference between domestic ownership of foreign assets and foreign 
ownership of domestic assets. 
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Example: Country A has a Current Account deficit relative to GDP of -5%, this means 
according to the identity that the country has a gap between domestic savings and domestic 
investment of 5%, this means that investment is 5 percentage point higher than savings, so the 
only source of capital should come from abroad. 
 
Balance of Payment Identity             𝐾𝐴 +  𝐹𝐴 = −(𝐶𝐴) 
 
Example: country A has a CA of -100 and FA+KA=100, then a sudden exogenous crisis 
happens and the demand of foreign goods decreases. CA= -60, the ( =60. 
 
The results in both cases are the same, a decrease of KA+FA that implies less capital 
moving across countries. As shown in the examples KA+FA >(KA  
 
In the Sinn work (R) is easier to observe because we use the b annually, in the Great 
Depression we can observe that prior to the crisis the 𝑏𝑆𝑛 of 1925 to 1928 was relatively low 
but in 1930 was increasing, the same happens with the Great Recession before 2008 was 
relatively low and after 2009, 𝑏𝑆𝑛was increasing. We can also observe the minor crisis, for 
instance, the dotcom bubble and the 2001 recession, we can see that prior 2001 there was falling 
but during 2003/4 there is a small increase, which is expected because the recession was short 



















Model 1: Panic of 1893, The Great Depression 1929, The Dotcom 2001 & The Great 
Recession 2008 
 
Panic of 1893, The Great Depression 1929, The Dotcom 2001 & The Great Recession 2008, Font: Taylor 
(1996), Sinn (1992) and Jordà et al. (2016), Source: Own Made 
 
As expected, during economic booms, capital mobility increases but during recession 
time capital flows suffer a sudden stop, either cause by the capital account (decrease) or the 
financial account (ΔAssets −  ΔLiabilities) < 0. 
CAPITAL MOBILITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
 
The International Monetary and Financial System (IMFS) consists of a set of rules and 
system/institutional framework in which most of the world economies work from the 
international flow standpoint. In plain English, what are the channels and conditions that capital 
and goods move? 
 
To understand the IMFS functioning, it is important to know the concept of the 
Impossible Trinity or the Trilemma Theory (a basic constraint in the design of any IMFS); this 
hypothesis states that there are 3 desirables conditions, fixed exchange rate, independent 
monetary policy, and free movement of capital, yet these three conditions cannot exist at the 
same time, only two is possible. By inference, we can state that there are 3 different types of 
IMFS based on the hypothesis; the first one (A) is fixed exchange rate and free movement of 
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capital (dependent monetary policy), the second (C) is fixed exchange rate and independent 
monetary policy (no free movement of capital) and the last one (B) is independent monetary 
policy and free movement of capital (floating exchange rate). 
 
Figure 1: The Impossible Trinity Figure 
 
The Impossible Trinity Figure; source: Own Made
 
 
The A-type would be the Gold Systems, both centered in London10 and New York11 . 
The C type would be the Bretton Woods System, although that is also a Gold Exchange System, 
only the USD was convertible to gold, and each other currencies were pegged to the US dollar-
from now on this paper will call it Dollar System. The B type would be free movement of 
capital and independent monetary policy (with a floating system). This will be the current 
system that most countries in the OECD works (except the countries in the Eurozone). 
 
The IMFS is important for our paper because as the economist of the Bank of 
International Settlement, Claudio Borio pointed out “The Achilles heel of the present-day 
international monetary and financial system (IMFS) is that it amplifies a key weakness of 
domestic monetary and financial regimes  
-up of financial imbalances, in 
 
10 The London System is commonly known as the Gold Standard System (1870’s to 1914) each currency was 
convertible to gold and each citizen could convert its bills into gold. 
 
11 The New York System is a Gold Exchange System (1925- 1931), in contrast to the Gold Standard, only central 
banks and big firms were able to change paper into gold. 
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the form of unsustainable credit and asset price booms that overstretch balance sheets, thereby 
leading to serious (systemic) banking crises and macroeconomic dislocations (Borio & 
Disyatat, 2011). Therefore, there are systems that could exuberate the weakness of the domestic 
market in the form of assets bubbles. This paper will try to link the concept of “excess financial 
elasticity” of Borio, the Global Saving Glut of Bernanke with the Great Depression and the 
Great Recession. 
 
Starting with the Borio’s idea about the role of the IMFS and the inability to prevent 
build ups of asset and credits booms that leads to serious financial crises12. The following graph 
from Qian et al (2010), we can observe the frequencies of financial crises from 1800 to 2010. 
 
       Figure 2: The Frequency of Financial crises from 1800-2010  
 
The Frequency of Financial crises from 1800-2010, Data Font: (Qian, 2010)  










12 Financial crises are defined as any of a broad variety of situations in which an asset suddenly loses 
a large part of the nominal value. Examples of financial crisis include banking crisis, sovereign debt 
crisis and currency crisis. 
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Figure 3: Number of financial crises, sample of 20 OECD countries 
 
 
Number of financial crises, Sample of 20 OECD countries. 
Data Font:http://www.macrohistory.net/data/ Source:Own made. 
 
It is quite surprising and a mystery that from the periods from the 1940s to the 1970s, 
there were no financial crises in the high-income economies and marginal crises in the middle 
and low-income economies. Moreover, in that three-decade window, the world economy 
experienced a phase of high economic growth, technological improvement, and convergence 
of the world economy in general. One possible explanation of the lack of financial crises during 
the periods are regulations by national’s government that prevented the build-up of credits 
booms and bust cycles that had recently affected the world economy in the 19th Century and 
the Interwar period, finally, the financial system during the period was characterized by low 
leverage due to the regulators’ constraint and capital restriction that prevented the massive 
inflow of foreign capital. This can be related with the condition of the international monetary 
and financial system; at the time (1950’s to 1970’s) we had a type C system-The Bretton 
Woods. 
 
Despite the differences between type A (Gold Standard) and type B (Current system in 
some countries), both have surprisingly cyclical financial crises; graphically, it looks like that 




The analysis approaches 
 
Intuitively, we can say that the Bretton Woods would be the period with less capital 
mobility because there was restriction of it. Then, the Gold Standard and The Current System 
might be the periods with the highest capital mobility, but the degree of freedom would depend 
on international market integration. So, if capital control does not exist, then the period with 
the highest global integration will be the most freed in terms of capital mobility. 
 
 Again, if we want to prove the capital mobility, we will use the F-H test. However, 
since this paper will analyze the period, so cross-sectional analysis will be useless. The most 
efficient model must be a panel model because we will be dealing with n identities and t 
periods. 
 
 There are three approaches to analyze the panel data. The first one and probably the 
less fit is the Independent Pooled Model. This model consists of having a sample randomly 
selected from a large population at a different point of time (Wooldridge, 2012). For example, 
every year we select a random sample and measure the saving rates and investment rates. 
 
(𝐼 𝑌⁄ )𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎
𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 + 𝑏𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙(𝑆 𝑌⁄ )𝑖,𝑡   + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
 
 The second approach is known as the Fixed Effect Model or the within estimator. This 
model will remove from the data the unobserved variables that are constant across individuals 
(in our case, countries). They have a fixed effect, so any change to an individual, it will be the 
same. For example, any effect for being a landlocked country, an OECD country...will not 
change over time. 
 
(𝐼 𝑌⁄ )𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎
𝐹𝐸𝑀 + 𝑏𝐹𝐸𝑀(𝑆 𝑌⁄ )𝑖,𝑡   + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
 
 The third approach is known as the Random Effect Model, it is attractive when we think 
the unobserved effect is uncorrelated with all the explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2006). It 
is like the opposite to the within estimator, the unobserved variable does affect the results. For 
instance, the price of a meal varies depending on the location. 
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(𝐼 𝑌⁄ )𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎
𝑅𝐸𝑀 + 𝑏𝑅𝐸𝑀(𝑆 𝑌⁄ )𝑖,𝑡   + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
 
The question now is which approach is the most fitted for our data set. We know that 
the Pooled estimator will certainly be unfit for our data set, but we can test it with the Breusch-
Pagan Test (The null hypothesis is Pooled estimator, and the alternative hypothesis is 
Fixed/Random Effect Model). 
 
Then the Hausman Test (The null hypothesis is Random Effect Model and the 
alternative hypothesis Fixed Effect) A rejection using the Hausman test is taken to mean that 
the key Random Effect assumption is false, and then the FE estimates are used (Wooldridge, 
2012). 
 
The procedure of this section will, first, explain the main characteristics of the period. 
Then we will proceed with the Breusch-Pagan Test (To check if it fits pooled or others). Finally, 
in the case that we reject the hypothesis we will proceed with the Hausman Test. Individually, 
the results will not tell much but we can use it to compare across the periods and support our 
idea. 
 
The subsample we will use to determine the b will be as follows: 
 
 First, this paper will analyze the Gold System. We will model the period, so from 
1870’s to 1914 and 1925s to 1931. Then we will do it separately for the first period 
(1870’s to 1914) and the second period (1925s to 1936). 
 
 Second, we will analyze the Bretton Woods period from 1955 to 1971 (Although the 
period started in 1944, we will exclude from 1945 to 1955 to avoid the effects of WWII 
and the period of reconstruction). 
 









The Gold System period can be subdivided into two different periods; the first one is 
the Gold Standard System (1870’s to 1914), then the First World War hit, and we have a period 
of floating exchange rate due to the inability of the European countries to commit13 to the 
system, after the war, countries tried to re-enter the system, but the international environment 
changed dramatically and during this period there were serious economic imbalances between 
countries. Moreover, there were changes between the economic centers, from London to New 
York. Some minor changes in the functioning system also appeared; the first one is the inability 
of individual citizens to exchange paper money for gold. 
 
As a whole, the Gold Standard System had a 𝑏𝑅𝐸𝑀 of approximately 0.56, Since the 
tests have shown that the best estimator is the Random Fixed Effect. Taking into face value, 
the interpretation is that if savings increases by 1pp then investment on average would 
increase by 0.56pp, in this sense, we can say that during the period there was high capital 
mobility (If we take the approach of b closer to one means capital immobility and lower betas 




The pre-1914 system was operated very smoothly (beating the expectation) and still 
nowadays is a mystery of economic studies. Some speculation is that the relatively good 
relationship between countries helped to maintain the system, there was cooperation among 
NCB’s and governments were committed-specially France, UK, and Germany- to a narrow 
 
13 The system consisted that the amount of gold that NCB had must be equal to the value of all bills in circulation; 
during WWI, national governments needed to finance the world by printing money and thus NCB were not able 
to maintain the pegged. 
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pegged to the Gold in an environment of free capital mobility. (Eichengreen, 1992) focuses on 
the commitment by governments and cooperation among central banks as the main pillar of the 
regime. Also, during this period, a high percentage of the GDP was devoted to the international 
capital flow, especially the UK, which was the core of the world economy at the time. The UK 
balance of payment provided a loanable fund to the world market that was channeled in the 
City of London. 
current account deficit (relative to GDP) in the principal receiving countries such as 
Argentina, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the US (although in the latter this was mainly 
before1860), was on the order of three percent and much higher in many years. In the so-called 
periphery, the levels were somewhat lower in absolute value but still significant in certain 
years. Foreign investment often accounted for about 20 percent of gross investment in the 
typical developing country of the time and up to 50 percent in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, and 
Canada.Great Britain exported the majority of capital flows while France, Germany, Belgium, 
and Holland provided smaller amounts. In Great Britain, the current account surplus never 
fell below one percent of GDP and averaged over four percent of GDP the entire period. 
France was the second-largest capital exporter at the time. The volumes exported were about 
half those of Britain. ( Meissner, 2013) 
As for the period of the belle époque (1870-1914), we can observe that capital mobility 
was quite mobile in contrast to the period. 𝑏𝑅𝐸𝑀(As before the best estimator is the REM) is 




The interwar period system in contrast to the previous system was characterized by 
instability, first, the cooperation and commitment of national institutions all but disappeared. 
The new kingmaker, the US was not as cooperative and committed to world stability as the 
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British empire and the axis of London-Paris-Berlin, which previously enabled cooperation, 
conflicted due to the scars of the war (The interwar lack of confidence problem). Furthermore, 
lack of anticipation and organization to re-enter the gold standard created global imbalances; 
the British pound entered as an overvalued currency and therefore it ran important trade 
deficits, meanwhile, the FF entered the gold system undervalued and therefore it had trade 
surpluses and in contrast to the pre-war system, there was gold accumulation by some countries 
(France and US mainly)-Adjustment problem.  
Finally, there was a liquidity problem, at the prevailing set of gold parity, it was inadequate to 
finance the economic growth, trade increase, and serve as the national currency backer. There 




As for the interwar period, we cannot get the proper tests (Hausman and Breusch-
Pagan) nor the Random Effect Model, because there are countries that have data omitted or nor 
available. Nevertheless, it still shows differences between the first period and the interwar 
period. As a whole, the Gold Systems period had an average of 0.56, the Gold Standard 0.51but 
the interwar period had a b of around 0.76, significantly larger and with an interpretation of 








The Bretton Woods Agreement 1944-1971 
 
The Bretton Woods Agreement aimed to create a new international monetary order to 
avoid the mistakes of the interwar period. It aimed to create a stable exchange rate, national 
full employment policies (or Keynesian policies), and cooperation. After WWII, the United 
States rose as the world’s richest and strongest country, and therefore it was expected to be the 
creditor of the world. 
 
 
As for the Bretton Woods period, the capital mobility is closed to unity. The 𝑏𝑅𝐸𝑀(the 
best estimator, so unbiased and most efficient estimator) is 0.81 approximately, which indicates 
low capital mobility. In comparison, the b of the Gold System was 0.56 as a whole, if we 
separate the Gold System, we have that the Gold Standard System has a b of 0.51 and the Gold 
Exchange System has a b of 0.76. 
 
The architects of the new system aimed that every currency of the world (or at least the 
Western countries) was equal and the duties of each government were to ensure the pair value, 
even if the other nation had to help the country with the problem. The reality, the US was the 
main holder of the gold reserve and therefore other countries pegged their currency to the 
dollar, which was the only currency convertible to gold, and governments needed to intervene 
if the exchange rate varied by 1%. The second idea was to create an international fund 
(International Monetary Fund), each country would deposit their reserve and in the case of 
balance of payment deficit withdraw to cover the deficit if the problem persisted then 
governments needed to alter fiscal policy, and if the problem was a fundamental disequilibrium, 
then the country should alter the parity until reaching the new equilibrium.  
The third mechanism was capital controls, to avoid speculative attacks against a country and 
avoid unilateral and premature alteration of the exchange rate. 
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This period can be divided into 2 periods; the first one; The Pre-Convertibility Period 
1946- 1958, and the second one The Convertibility Period 1959-1971. The first period is the 
transition period in which European countries tried to adjust the new order and rebuild their 
economies. This period had two main problems: bilateralism and shortage of dollars, the United 
States after the war had almost ⅔ of the gold reserve, and the European countries had massive 
current account deficits to maintain the supply of essential goods therefore some countries 
implemented temporary trade restrictions. 
The Second period was the Convertibility Period, this period European countries achieved the 
conditions necessary to maintain a pair value with the dollar, this period can be considered as 
the Heyday of the Bretton woods agreement. 
 
From 1968 to 1971, the system started to crack due to the expansionary policies of the 
United States to finance the Vietnam War and welfare programs, this created inflation due to 
the expansionary policies of the Federal Reserve, which was more important full employment 
policies than price control policy. Adding on top of that, the productivity growth of countries 
like West Germany and Japan implied a loss of the US competitiveness that translated to a 
shrink of the US Balance of payment surplus. The pressure of a revaluation of the dollar was 
mounting but several attempts14 were done before the 1971 suspension of the USD 
convertibility to gold, the system then collapsed. 
The Current Monetary and Financial System (1980-now) 
 
In the 2015 Annual Conference of the Bank of International Settlement, William White 
described the current international monetary and financial system as “We do not have an 
international monetary system, we have a kind of monetary non-system. There are no rules out 
there, everybody can do whatever they want, and they are. What this means is that this 
international monetary system has got very bad characteristics. One, there is no automatic 
rebalancing of the current account balances, it does not happen automatically. Second, there 
are material international spillovers for easy money in big countries. A third characteristic, 
the whole economic and financial system are dangerously unanchored, actors can do whatever 
 
14 The creation of the SDR, a new asset that was composed of a basket of currency, alleviating the pressure of the 
USD. 
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they want and lastly, in the event of something going wrong in this non-monetary system, there 
is no lender of last resort ” (White, 2015). 
 
Maurice Oberstfeld in the paper “The international monetary system: Living in 
asymmetry” described the current system and its failure: 
financial innovation, globalization, and development, sharp international asymmetries remain 
and thus coordination failures with recognizable analogs in earlier historical eras have 
emerged. Previous efforts at international monetary reform attempted  
domestic (Kamp, 2017)economic stability with a 
smooth international adjustment mechanism. Those attempts had limited success and even the 
most ambitious and successful of them the Bretton Woods system crumbled after a quarter-
century under the weight of its internal contradictions. The recent global crisis has highlighted 
the twenty-first-century incarnations of a range of time-honored systemic strains. Some of the 
problems have become more severe, or problematic in new ways. The resulting pressures on 
 
 
The First problem that Oberstfeld and White described is the current account 
imbalances of the developed countries, the United States, in particular, has had since the 1990's 
a widening of the current account deficit and there is no automatic balancing, furthermore, even 
with a huge trade deficit policy implemented by the US government lacks effectiveness. (i.e., 
Trump administration trade war). Another problem that affects most of the OECD countries is 
the increasing deficits of the public administration and therefore the alarming debt 
accumulation by certain countries. 
 
The second problem is that every actor can do whatever they want, there is a lack of 
cooperation among countries; every country is on their own.  One example is with the EU, after 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreement (BWA), the EEC (current EU) created the 
European Snake that tried to simulate the functioning of the BWA, although there were 
significant changes. The European Monetary System, which had the German Mark as the new 
“Dollar” in the Union, collapsed in 1992 when the UK and Italy suffered speculative attacks 
and had to withdraw from the EMS. Later in 1999, the EU implemented a new currency 
“EURO” that was characterized by the fixed exchange rate, and free movement of capital, 
therefore the European Central Bank was created as the responsible for monetary policy in the 
Eurozone (The national governments have no longer power on monetary policy under ECB). 
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Meanwhile, the United States implemented the free capital of movement and independent 
monetary policy (floating exchange rate). China, the new power of the 21st century has a 
different monetary policy, it tries to balance the impossible trinity, to achieve the 3 corners, on 
April 5th, 2017, “ - a 
stable yuan, open borders and control of its interests-is nonsense.” wrote Jake Van der Kamp, 
reporter of the South China Morning Post15. As we can see, each country tries to pursue its 
policy but de facto the dominant position is free trade and independent monetary policy, the 
ECB as a block can determine its interest rate as the Federal Reserve, moreover, EURUSD has 
no fixed exchange regime and finally there is free movement of capital across the two.  Japan's 
third economy has the same policy in terms of the impossible trinity as the United States. The 
case of China is more difficult to determine but it looks like they are in a de facto fixed 
exchange rate and thus independent monetary policy and free capital movement. 
 
current account surplus (which 
-floating exchange rate, this would 
have resulted in a significantly 
what was observed. Instead, China kept a relatively fixed exchange rate system by selling 
the rate of demand growth for its domestic currency. Hence, the significant build-up in foreign 
reserves to over US$4 trillion  (Macken,2014). 
In respect to capital mobility, we can see that this period has the highest mobility the 
𝑏𝑅𝐸𝑀(the best estimator, so unbiased and most efficient estimator) is 0.34. In contrast, the Gold 
System 0.51 (Gold Standard System, 1870-1914 is 0.56 and Gold Exchange Rate,1925-1936 
is 0.76) and the Bretton Woods is 0.81. So, we can conclude that this period is the age of highest 
mobility and Bretton Woods the lowest. 
 
15 South China Morning post is a Hong Kong’s English language newspaper. 
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To conclude, we observe that nowadays there is no international financial system, there 
is a lack of international monetary cooperation among countries and free movement of capital 
can exacerbate domestic financial weaknesses. This situation is reminiscent of the 1920s when 
each country applied its policies and ended up with a financial bubble fueled partially by the 
easiness of credit access to invest in the stock market16, consumption goods, and housing.  It is 
a similar situation to the housing bubble where loans only were accepted if there was a 
collateral asset that back the credit, even if it was a risky asset17 
THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE GLOBAL SAVING GLUT THEORY AND THE 
FORMATION OF BUBBLES 
 
referring to 
the Dotcom crisis and the 2001 Recession) did not much change the net effect of the global 
saving glut on the U.S. current account. The transmission mechanism changed, however, as 
low real interest rates rather than high stock prices became a principal cause of lower U.S. 
saving. In particular, during the past few years, the key asset-price effects of the global saving 
glut appear to have occurred in the market for residential investment, as low mortgage rates 
have supported record levels of home construction and strong gains in housing prices. Indeed, 
increases in home values, together with a stock-market recovery that began in 2003, have 
recently returned the wealth-to-income ratio of U.S. households to 5.4, not far from its peak 
value of 6.2 in 1999 and above its long-run (1960-2003) average of 4.8. The expansion of U.S. 
housing wealth, much of it easily accessible to households through cash-out refinancing and 
 
16 The credits for investing the stock market only occurred in the state of New York, specifically New York City 
 
17 In 1929 the risky asset would be the stock and in 2008 would be housing. 
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home equity lines of credit, has kept the U.S. national saving rate low--and indeed, together 
with t (Bernanke, 2005). 
 
In the 2005 infamous speech by back then Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben S. 
Bernanke attributed the price boom of the housing market to an influx of foreign capital that 
pushed interest rates lower that stimulated the borrowing of loans to buy residential investment. 
The influx of foreign capital was propelled by exogenous (to the US) events, such as, financial 
crises that change the pattern of the emerging markets, from being net borrowers to net lenders. 
This event had a profound impact on the current account of the US, that during the decade went 
from surplus to deficit, at the same time the transmission of this sudden influx was through 
endogenous changes on equity prices, real exchange rates, US exchange rate. 
The last emphasis that Benanke made is that the deficit of the US government during 
the Bush Tax cuts “actually prevented the creation of a bigger housing bubble” by draining 
the global saving glut. 
 
Implicitly, Bernanke assumes that any decrease in the US budget deficit would have a 
big impact on world interest rates and, in turn falls in the world interest rate would have a big 
impact on US investment and on US consumption -- helped along by things like interest-only 
mortgages. In formal terms, the elasticities need to be large. (Setser, 2005) 
 
The hypothesis of this work is the same as Bernanke's idea of the Global Saving Glut 
that exacerbated domestic weaknesses and asset bubbles fueled by foreign cheap credit. The 
idea is that without an IMFS that allowed an uncontrolled capital movement, the sudden 
increase in equity prices would not exist and therefore the crises caused by a credit crunch due 
to a sudden decrease in the collateral asset. 
The detailed hypothesis, which this paper will try to prove is as follows. 
 
An event outside of the domestic borders, translates to a sudden influx of capital in the 
home country, as consequence, the aggregate savings18 in the home country increases, this 
increase shifts the savings curve. The borrowing curve remains the same and therefore there is 
a decrease of interest rates. The decline of interest rates implies that borrowing cost decreases 
 
18 The aggregate savings of the capital market is the sum of the domestic savings (either public or private) and 
the foreign savings that seek to invest in the home country. 
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and therefore stimulates the demand of certain assets that can be used as collateral ( House or 
stock).-Thus far, it follows the idea of the Global Saving Glut by Bernanke.-However, we can 
extend the hypothesis and state the following: At the event of an increase of demand of the 
certain asset and the subsequent formation of the bubble, the demand of the savings ( the 
borrowing curve) increases and thus an increase of the interest rate, this will cause that the 
demand of that asset is less attractive for the investors and therefore a decrease of the asset 
demand, this will translate to a decrease on the price and finally a panic among investors to 
sell, and finally, prices collapse. 
 
Figure 4: The Capital effect on the creation of bubbles, a comprehensive diagram 
 
 
The Capital effect on the creation of bubbles, a comprehensive diagram, source: Own Made 
 
 
The idea of the Global Saving Glut is usually applied to the Great Recession of the 
2007/8, but what if we can use this hypothesis to describe the best-known crisis in history? Of 
course, we are referring to the Great Depression of the 30’s. 
 
For now, we have shown that capital mobility “degree” moves significantly across 
history, specifically following changes on the IMFS. Also, we have proved that Bretton Woods 
was the only period in recent history that the world has not experienced any financial crises. 
Coincidentally, the system in which the Bretton Woods is known was capital control and 
cooperation among countries through international institutions (like the IMF or the World 
Bank).  
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THE ROLE OF CAPITAL MOBILITY & GLOBAL SAVING GLUT HYPOTHESIS 
IN THE GREAT CRISES 
 
In this part we must describe the event of the seminal Great Crises in recent world 
history, specifically in the context of the Global Saving Glut hypothesis. 
The Great Depression (1929-1933) 
 
First this paper will analyze the Great Depression, specifically, the role that capital 
might play on the bubble and the financial crisis. 
 
Before analyzing the seminal economic disaster of the roaring 20’s and the 30’s, we 
have to explain the consequences of WWI. Out of many consequences, the most important one 
for this paper is the change of the US position in the international capital market, from a debt 
position to a credit position. 
 
“The war transformed the United States from a net debtor to a creditor nation: between 
1914 and 1919, largely as a result of loans floated on behalf of the French and British 
position of comparable magnitude” (Eichengreen, The Gold-Exchange Standard and the Great 
Depression, 1987) 
 
After the war, the US was in a hegemonic position in economic terms, but the 
international capital market remained becalmed. The difference of rate of returns might have 
reignited some US foreign lending, however the role of other factors like risk played a more 
important role, by 1923 the US investors were virtually unwilling to lend to foreigners at any 
price. So long, the international market was in disarray and the doubts about the ability of other 
countries to generate revenue through trade surplus, the international capital market would 
remain dried. By the mid 1920’s, the world situation improved greatly thanks partially to the 
League of Nations program of stabilization loans, moreover, the financial innovations of the 
1920’s stimulated the investment on the international capital market. 
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“The growth of the investment trust enabled the small investor to participate in the 
market. Together, the rapid development of retailing and underwriting activities and the 
proliferation of investment vehicles provided organizations and individuals both the incentive 
and the opportunity to increase their participation in foreign bond markets  (Eichengreen, 
1987). 
In the table shown below19, it is shown that from 1923 to 1924, the amount of foreign 
lending more than doubled, from 413.3 million to 961.3 million. If we compare the same figure 
to 1927, the amount tripled in 3 years, from 413.3 in 1923 to 1,304.6. 
Furthermore, the averages of the 1920/24 period and the 1925/28 shows that it is 
consistently larger in the latter (so an increase in US investment abroad). 633.1 million on 
average in the 1920-1924 period, 1,181.4 (Almost doubled). 
Most of the capital went to Europe (around 45%), Canada (around 25%), Latin America 
(around 20%) and Asia (around 10%). However, in 1929, the capital crashed to 658.2 million 
(50% drop). By 1929, Europe was no longer the predominant region that US investors invest, 
there was a drop in the share from 48% in 1928 to 21.5% in 1929. 
Figure 5: Distribution of foreign issuing between 1919-1929 
Source: Computed from U.S. Dept. of Commerce, American Underwriting of Foreign Securities (various 
issues), Historical Statistics of the United States (1976). Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 because of 
rounding. 
 











Figure 6.  Source: Computed from: Banking, 
Currency, and Finance in Europe Between the Wars, 
Charles H. Feinstein (1995). 
 
Analyzing Europe as a continent, we can see that half of Europe financed the other part 
of the continent. The combined countries that had a credit account amounted to almost 3,850 
million dollars. Meanwhile, the debtor side amounted to -7,820 million dollars (more than 50% 
came from Germany). The continent had a negative -3,970 million dollars. Most of the capital 
came from the US, where the appetite of the American investor never seemed to have a limit 
regarding German bonds regardless of the purpose of the loans or the interest earned by placing 
the capital in German bank accounts. (Feinstein,1995). 
 
As for the United States, the US economy was prosperous after WWI, the GDP grew 
on average 4.7% annually and unemployment rates stayed an average of 3.7%. Part of the 
growth was due to business taking advantage of new technological processes that enabled 
advantage of economies of scale and scope (apparition of vertically integrated companies). The 
rise of new enterprises created an unprecedented financial need, but the regulations of the 
nineteenth century prevented the purchase of equity and the ability to provide long term debt20. 
To circumvent this problem, most commercial banks created affiliates that the sole purpose of 
it was to buy securities, thus allowing them de facto to provide services from financial banks. 
These affiliates attracted many new customers and became big distributors of stocks and bonds, 
enabling them to become underwriters. Still, this financial innovation did not include small 
 
20 Federal government prohibited lending more than 10% of their capital to one customer, and restrictions by 
state governments prevented nominally long-term lending. 
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investors until the advent of investment trust21According to Carosso (1970), investment trusts 
grew from about 40 in 1921 to over 750 in 1929. Furthermore, the role of broker loans and 
margin purchase increased the demand for securities, allowing access to customers that due to 
their low capital and financial capacity would not enter and at the same time providing them 
leverage to trade in the market was an error because these individuals could not repay the debt 
with their assets and after the crash the collateral value decrease more than the total debt 
outstanding, thus creating instability that led to the Great Depression. After the crash, Irving 
Fisher described that the major problem with the "unwise" speculation in the long bull market 
was the use of so much borrowed money. 
 
Figure 7:  
 
 
Stock Price and Broker’s Loans, Data Font: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943) & The 
New York Stock Exchange Yearbook (1931), Source: White (1990) 
 
Historians acknowledge that during this period there was credit flexibility, and 
(Kindleberger, 1973) identifies that the rising supply of loans from non-financial institutions 
as responsible for fueling the stock market. 
 
To analyze the credit booms, we can use the Real Credit to GDP and compere the long 
term trend (Mendoza & Terrones, 2012) to define an episode as a credit boom when the amount 
of credit extended by the banking system to the private sector grows by more than that 
experienced during a typical cyclical expansion.  
 
21 Investment trusts were primarily institutions that sold securities to the public and used the proceeds to invest 
in stocks and bonds. There were two main types: management trusts where managers had discretion over the 
portfolio and fixed trusts where the portfolio could not be changed. 
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Therefore, we need to analyze the credit cycle on the long run to see what the average 
is and determine the existence of a credit boom for the period.  The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter 
will be useful to determine it.  
 
The data used for the period from 1916-1945 came from the database of microhistory 
(Jordà et al), we use loans to non-financial institutions as a proxy variable of total private credit, 
we have divided the total loans by the population to get credit per capita. Then, we divided the 
CPI (2010=100) to get the Real Credit to Capita, finally we use the Napierian logarithm to get 
the line. 
 
The methodology follows the threshold approach by Mendoza and Terrones and they 
define as follows, the long run is calculated by the HP filter and denotes the long-term trend, 
any credit boom is a significant and contiguous deviation from the trend, so we must observe 
an area that is above the smoothed trend. 
 
Figure 8: The credit cycle of the US 1916-1945 
  
The Credit Cycle of the US 1916-1945, Data: www.macroeconomichistory.com .  
Font: Own Made 
 
In the graph we can observe that during the period of 1925-1930, the US experienced a 
period of credit boom, at the same time, experienced an outflow of capital towards other 
nations. This situation could infer that (i) the US capital stock (savings) increased significantly 
and therefore explaining the credit boom, (ii) Although the demand for credit increased, the 
capital stock increased at a much rapid pace. So, savings was much greater than domestic 
investment (the Global/ “American” Saving Glut Hypothesis) consequently, the US 
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experienced outflow of capital towards more profitable countries. (iii) Timing coincides with 
the increase of US foreign investments abroad, the stock bubble and the burst of the bubble. 
As mentioned above, US investment abroad picked up in the 1925/26 and collapsed in 1929/30 
approximately after the stock market crash. This could be an indicator that the stock market 
rally and the frenzy by the US investor to invest abroad were fueled by the easiness to access 
credit. 
The Great Recession (2007-2009) 
 
Many comparisons have been drawn between the Great Recession and the Great 
Depression. As Eichegreen pointed out, many commentators have remarked the similarities 
between the crisis with the “Four bad bears”, a graph that shows the S&P 500 for both periods 
and the same period for the Dow. Moreover, the naiveness of Central Bankers of both periods 
is shockingly similar that economic policy has tamed the economic cycle.  In the 1920's, it was 
said that the world had entered a new “Economic Era” with economic stability with the 
establishment of the Central Banks and the FED. The naive idea was proven wrong in 1929. 
The same can be told in the early 2000’s, in the gospel of the Great Moderation, an era of 
diminishing business cycle volatility due to advancement of Central banks. Once again, it was 
proven wrong with the collapse of Lehman Brother. The parallels of both crises cannot stop 
there, the role of the credit cycle, partially encouraged by the belief that sharp economic 
reversals were past stories, fueled asset bubbles (In 1929, Stock Market and in 2008 the 
Housing Market). The fundamentals seem equal, credit booms, a uncoordinated IMFS, new 
financial innovation and bad practices… generated the 2 most influential crises for economic 
history. 
 
The optics of the Great Recession is “like a mirror hall” of the Great Depression, 
financial innovation, central banking policy and the relatively calmed years prior to the crises 
that lead to disastrous economic and social consequences across the world. 
 
Once again, we must go back to find the roots of the crisis in the United States, that 
subsequently will bring the world to another crisis. On December 31st, 1991, the Soviet Union 
ceased to exist, capitalism won the cold war and the subsequent year, the world experienced a 
wave of globalization policy; NAFTA (1994), Maastricht Treaty (1992), China Globalization 
policy (1990’s) ...The hegemony of the United States was unquestionable, and an era of new 
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economic stability propelled the US economy, the era of the Great Moderation for the Western 
Countries has started. 
 
But first, massive crises in the developing world bring a change of paradigm for the US 
economy. One consequence of these series of crises was the increasing uncertainty by investors 
to lend money to those affected countries, as consequence net savings rates in Asia increased 
significantly due to new economic strategies focusing on being net exporters of capital, 
building up reserves and being less dependent of foreign capital. (Basco, 2011) 
 
 
Figure 9: Net Savings of a sample of South-Asia Countries from 1980-2005 
 
Net Savings of a sample of South-Asia Countries from 1980-2005, Data: World Bank data base.  
Font: Own Made 
 
As we can observe in the graph, most countries had been experiencing a decline in the 
net savings rates from the late 80’s, but suddenly we can see a sharp reversal from 1997 
onwards. The sudden reversal will influence the US economy. 
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The first consequence is that the trade surplus of the Asian countries increased (𝑆 −
𝐼) ↑= (𝑋 − 𝑀) ↑. This increase of surplus must be met by a decrease on the trade surplus (or 
increase of deficit) of the other countries. The question is who was the country that absorbed 
it? The answer is the United States. Since 1998, the US current account deficit has been getting 
bigger and bigger. The timing coincides with the 1997 Asian crisis. 
In 1997, the US had a deficit in the current account of -1.64% of GDP and net savings 
of -0.36, by 2005 the deficit almost quadrupled to 5.75% and a net savings of -5.09%.  
Many economists have argued that the problem of the US deficit is related to a decrease in 
domestic savings, in 1985 domestic savings was 18% of the GDP, in 1995 16% and 2004 14%. 
(Bernanke, 2005). 
 
Figure 10: Net Savings and Current Account 
 
Net Savings and Current Account, Source: World Bank Data Base.  
Font: Own Made 
 
One possible explanation of this is the Global Saving Glut theory by Benrnake, 
basically the summary of it is that foreign capital attracted by US equity market decrease the 
interest rates during the period of Great Moderation, thus stimulating the demand of loans and 
the subsequently decrease of US domestic savings, the increase of cheap credit help to build 
up the asset bubbles. This situation was only possible due to the IMFS that allow capital 
mobility across the country. The idea is that the system allowed credit booms due to a sudden 
influx of foreign capital. 
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The non-economical analogy is with the debate of gun control and mass shooting in the 
US. The US is infamous for having periodic mass shootings (equivalent for us, financial crises), 
Canada has stricter gun control laws, and we observe that the rate of mass shooting is 
significantly below to the US. There are many explanations of why someone would kill 
indiscriminately but one of them is mental illness. Scientifically, the US is no more different 
than Canada so we would expect that gun violence in Canada should be similar than the US, 
but it is not because of the strict gun legislation. At the end, you cannot commit a mass shooting 
without a gun. The idea that this paper wants to extrapolate is that financial crises are inevitable, 
if it happens, but we can reduce the rate of it by creating cooperation mechanisms at the 
international level (even if capital control is an option). 
 
We can observe the differences of it by looking at the credit booms that the US has 
experienced from 1945 to 2017. 
 
In the figure 11, from 1945 to 1970, the credit cycle was similar at the long-term 
average, but after that we can see that there are credit booms, to be precise 4 different credit 
booms. In 1973, 1978-1979, 1980-1990 approximately and 2003 to 2008. Looking in the figure 
12, we observe the credit boom of the 2003 to 2008 
 
Figure 11: The credit cycle of the US 1945-2017 
 
The credit cycle of the US 1945-2017, Data: www.macroeconomichistory.com .  






Figure 12: The credit cycle of the US 1992-20017 
 
The credit cycle of the US 1992-2017, Data: www.macroeconomichistory.com .  
Font: Own Made 
 
 
In contrast to the Great Depression, the dynamics of the Capital flow changed, the 
United States was no longer the lender but the number one borrower. The consequence of the 
massive inflow of capital, exploited the domestic weaknesses by creating asset bubbles (Borio, 
2015). Moreover, financial innovation allowed, like in the 1920’s, the access to consumers that 
were financially incapable to pay back under the assumption that the collateral (the house) 
would increase forever.  
 
Both crises are strikingly similar in the beginning, the diversion was in the response of 
it, one possible reason is that the chairman at the time, Bernanke, studied deeply the great 
depression and was willing to do “whatever it takes” to not commit the same mistakes. Still, 
an historical framework is not enough to prevent another bubble, many economists came up 
with different models to try to capture the essence of financial crises. One of the most 
understood models to recreate the formation is with the Overlapping Generation Model. 
 
This paper will use the Basco (2014) model because it allows the formation of so-called 
rational bubbles, the distinction between different countries (Basco contemplates two types of 
countries) and the integration between those countries in the international capital market. 
Moreover, the model of Basco (2014) tries to capture the essence of the Global Saving Glut 
that the other models do not enter in the hypothesis. 
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THE GLOBAL SAVING GLUT AND ASSET BUBBLE FORMATION: AN OLG 
APPROACH 
 
In the paper Globalization and Financial development: A model of the Dot Com and 
the Housing crisis (Basco,2014) extended the Overlapping Generation model to include the 
possibility of the formation of bubbles. The model has a three-time period; in the first period 
young agents earn a wage and borrow to purchase a house. In the second period, the middle 
age enjoys the house and lastly when old sells the house and spends all the savings. Although 
the model is only for the housing market, we can extend also to the stock market, particularly 
in the case of the roaring 20’s because one assumption of Basco's work is capital constraint to 
finance a house when young and therefore collatization of debt arises. This assumption allows 
us to explain the soaring stock market in the 1920’s due to the similarities between a stock and 
a house. In the 1920’s, poor individuals (who had financial constraints) borrowed money from 
the broker, the debt was ensured by the collateral asset, which the broker assumed that price 
would continue to grow. In the 2000’s a similar situation occurred, poor individuals with 
financial constraint were able to borrow to buy a house (which at the same time was the 
collateral), banks assumed that housing prices would grow forever. The only change was the 
asset type but the fundamental structure of debt collatization remain the same and both type of 
assets is considered infinite22. With the collatization of the debt, low interest rates will stimulate 
the demand of the asset in question, thus increasing the size of the bubble and attracting more 
potential investors. Anecdotally, we have the example of individuals that bought stocks in the 
stock boom of the 1920’s because (mainly) his friend got rich because of it. In the 2000’s the 
same happened, individuals bought houses, reformed and sold it weeks later with a profit. 
 
The results of the model can be summarized as follows: 
 
a) In autarky a financially developed country cannot have an asset bubble however 
financially underdeveloped could have asset bubbles. 
b) As the globalization process increases in magnitude the possibility of asset bubbles 
increases along it. 
 
22 Infinite meaning that both are expected to endure for a long period of time 
 38 
The model follows the following timing: the young is financially constrained, but it earns 
a salary because it is endowed with a unit of labor, however middle age and old do not have it. 
Young therefore must ask for a loan to purchase a house and enjoy it in the future. In middle 
age they enjoy the house and at the end of the period they sell the house. Finally, when old, 
they spent all the savings. The interpretation of this paper is not only for houses but also for 
stocks however the quantitative and qualitative calculations do not change. This timing tries to 
follow the life cycle; when young, we are underwater (the value of our “real owned “asset is 
below the liabilities), then we will arrive in the peak where our wealth is at the maximum and 
when old, we will use our accumulated capital for a retirement. 
 
Setting up the model, the budget constraint: 
 
When young, we need to buy a house that cost 𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡+1, the young agent will earn 𝑤𝑡  and 
must borrow 𝑑𝑡 but since the financial institution does not trust the young individual, it imposes 
a constraint so 𝑑𝑡 = 𝜃𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡+1 (collatization of debt arises). 
 
𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡+1 ≤ 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡    (1) 
 
In the middle age, they are able to build their savings (𝑎𝑡+1) in order to have a pleasant 
retirement and therefore at the end of the period they are able to repay the debt with a interest  
𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡, and sell the house at a higher price;  𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡+1< 𝑝𝑡+1ℎ𝑡+1: 
 
𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡 + 𝑎𝑡+1 ≤ (1 − 𝛿)𝑝𝑡+1ℎ𝑡+1   (2) 
Finally in the third period, old, they spend all the savings by consuming it. 
 
𝑐3𝑡+2 ≤ 𝑟𝑡+1𝑎𝑡+1    (3)   
 
The intertemporal constraint is 
 






𝑐3𝑡+2 = 𝑤𝑡   (4) 
   
Moreover, Basco's model distinguishes between financially developed and financially 
underdeveloped countries. The difference between the first one and the second one is that the 
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). The utility function is logarithmic, but it can be any kind, it is used 
for practical reasons. 
 
The financially developed country 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝑈(ℎ2𝑡+1, 𝑐3𝑡+2) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(ℎ2𝑡+1) + 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑐3𝑡+2) 
 






𝑐3𝑡+2 = 𝑤𝑡  
 















Borrowing or supply of assets, it decreases with the interest rates and since borrowing 
is directly connected to the collateral asset then it decreases with the purchasing price (𝑝𝑡) and 






















The demand function of the collateral asset (housing but also stocks) in the steady state 
is decreasing with the interest rates. The intuition behind is that if the cost of capital for a loan 
to buy a collateral asset decreases then it will encourage the demand for it. For instance, for 
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housing you will be encouraged to take a loan because it is cheaper. The same would happen 
to leverage your portfolio or enter the market though borrowing from the brokers. 
 
The financial underdeveloped countries 
 
Basco’s work assumes that there is a continuum mass 1 of underdeveloped countries, 
hence the number of developed countries in a financial sense is smaller than the countries that 
are not fully developed in a financial sense. So, initially there is only a small number of 
countries that have access to the international monetary and financial system but with the 
process of globalization, more and more countries would have access to the international 
market, so more credit flows into the financial developed world. 
 
The set-up of the problem of the financial underdeveloped country is 
   
𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝑈(ℎ2𝑡+1, 𝑐3𝑡+2) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(ℎ2𝑡+1) + 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑐3𝑡+2) 
 






𝑐3𝑡+2 = 𝑤𝑡  














The borrowing in a case of underdeveloped country does not depend on the interest 
rate, so it is inelastic. The economic intuition is that the underdeveloped country does not have 
“good institutions” and therefore people do not trust them. Even though there are savings, this 
saving might not be lent out because of some associated risk (from insolvency, volatility of the 









− 𝜃𝑟𝑡] 𝑤𝑡  
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Savings are decreasing in interest rates; this result is important to understand the 
existence of a bubble. The interest rates falls when there is financial development because this 
means that agents can borrow more, the middle age people (the savers) could have access at 
bigger houses (larger borrowing when young) and there is an increase on wealth due to the 
increase on asset supply, but the first one dominates the second one so the overall demand of 
asset decreases. The intuition is that households would like to increase their savings but are 
limited by the borrowing constraint and therefore they spend the increase on wealth on 
consumption. 
When the financially underdeveloped country integrates with the developed one, then the 
middle age agents are no longer constrained to invest, they can invest either in their home or 
abroad, so there is an existence of capital outflow. Graphically will be much easier to 
understand. 
Financially underdeveloped countries in Autarky 
 
 
Imagine that in time 0 there is an exogenous improvement of the financial system that 
allows an increase of borrowing, then this increase of borrowing will allow the middle age 
people at time 0 to lend more money (because they trust that they will have their savings 
returns), young at period 0 will borrow more in order to buy bigger houses (or any asset that 
can be collateralized). At period 1, the new middle age individuals will have their savings 
reduced relative to the last period group, this is because on average the loans were bigger and 
therefore the savings fell. 
 




The story might be told as follows, initially the 
financially underdeveloped country has no 
access to the international market, let’s say 
that the international monetary and financial 
system does not allow it. After an exogenous 
effect, the IMFS, allows countries to move 
capital across borders, then the middle-aged 
people will have the option to invest at home 
and abroad. Since there is a constraint in 
borrowing, then savings are not equal to 
borrowing (investments), thus there is a formation of “cash surplus” or as Bernanke called in 
2005, the Global Saving Glut. Therefore, the middle-aged investors decide to invest abroad 
instead of the home country and therefore a decrease in the savings in the home country. 
Now, imagine that there is an asset that promises very high return, since there is no capital 
control, the investors in a financially underdeveloped country (assuming that there are rational 
and the fees to invest abroad are not important) will invest more in the financially developed 
country (further decrease on demand). Consequently, in an open economy scenario interest 
tends to decrease, especially if there is an attractive asset that offers high return abroad. 
 
 
The flow of capital will go towards 
the financially developed country, if there is 
no attractive asset to invest (no bubbles) the 
flow would be “moderate”, interest rates 
would still fall. Now, imagine, that there is a 
scarce asset that can be collateralized with 
debt, usually housing and stocks, this will 
attract foreign capital and therefore it will 
“massively” expand the supply of savings23, 
the consequence is falling interest rates that it 
will have consequences in the collateralized asset (Housing or stock). 
 
23 Although domestic savings would decrease because they will be able to borrow more but in aggregate terms 
(internal and external), it will increase. 
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As the interest rates fall, the demand of 
the collateralized asset increases. The intuition 
behind is as the interest rates decrease, the cost 
of borrowing decreases too and therefore the 
buyers will have incentive to take bigger loans 
(to buy bigger houses or to have higher 
leverage in the stock market). Consequently, 
the demand of the asset increases and by the 
law of demand-supply, prices increase. Hence 
the demand for borrowing also expands over 
time and the interest rate increases. The cycle 
ends with a contraction of the demand of the asset, people start to panic due to aversion of 
losses and the bubble disappears. 
 
 One observation of the Basco’s OLG model is that tries to replicate the idea of the 
Global Saving Glut Hypothesis. The reasons are: 
 
1. Exogenous events, out of the financially develop countries hands, will have an effect 
on them. Mainly through capital influx that will lower interest rates. 
2. Even though in this paper did not discuss the implication on trade balance, the Basco’s 
investigation extended the model to include the topic on trade and the conclusion of his 
extended model is the same as for the Global Saving Glut Hypothesis, that the receiver 
will have trade deficit and the creditor trade surplus. 
3. Although it is not specifying what developed and not developed means in the Basco’s 
OLG model, in this paper will interpreted as the ability to generate new asset according 
to the demand of it, in the financially underdeveloped country, the financial system is 
not able to generate assets and thus the constrain, meanwhile, in the financially 
developed country is able to generate such financial asset and thus fulfilling the demand 
and therefore no constraint in it. 
4. Another implication of the model is with the Quantitative Theory of Money, originally 
this theory explains that if the monetary mass increases, then it will translate an increase 
on price if the other factors remain the same. However, we can extend this idea on the 
formation of bubbles and why if there is abundant capital, it will lead to bubbles. Let’s 
take the equation 𝑀 × 𝑉 = 𝑃 × 𝑌, let’s say that M represents the total amount of 
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savings (capital) and V represents the how many times your savings moves across the 
financial system (how many times you invest) then this should be equal on the amount 
of certain asset (Y=housing or stock market) times the price (P) of it. Let’s begin with 
the example of the autarky in the financially underdeveloped country, this means that 
the elasticity to generate new asset is low and therefore Y is immobile therefore if there 
is capital accumulation due to economic growth then P must increase and therefore 
generating a possible bubble. In an open economy, capital will flow in the financially 
developed country but initially they will be able to balance it, however if more countries 
integrate in the world economy, the elasticity to create new assets diminishes and 
therefore a bubble might form. 
5. Finally, this model can explain the excess financial elasticity (Borio,2019) that defines 
as the inability of domestic policy to prevent asset bubbles. The story this paper tries to 
build is as follows, financially underdeveloped countries accumulate assets, but they 
are unable to invest in their home country because of certain constraint (Basco,2014) 
then this will generate a situation in which the savings are far greater than investment, 
generating the Global Saving Glut (Bernanke,2005). Since the main reason that savings 
moves from financially constrained countries to financially unconstrained countries is 
due to the lack of good investment in the first one then the latter is unable to make 
policy to prevent the build-up because they are “inelastic” on interest rates and 
subsequently the formation of the bubble (Borio,2015). All this scenario is only 
possible if the IMFS allows capital mobility and therefore it can explain why in the 
Bretton Woods period there were no financial crisis in the developed countries (as 
shown also in the model that financially developed country in autarky is unable to create 
asset bubbles). 
 
 Obviously, this model fits the description of the Great Recession because the literature 
that this paper used to describe this model is specific to the Great Recession. However, this 
paper will make the bold hypothesis that this idea can also applied to the Great Depression. 
 
 First, we can see that the US in the 1920’s was a period of high growth rates and 
therefore capital accumulation that translated to credit booms. As explained before, the US 
investor was initially not confident to European’s countries ability to provide good investment 
and therefore they kept their money at home, however by mid-1920’s the US ability to provide 
that good investment diminished because capital growth outgrew the investment growth and 
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therefore generating a Global (American)Saving Glut, adding the change of attitude of US 
investor due to an improvement of German economy, it attracted capital from the US to Europe, 
however in 1927/8, Germany was able to generate positive trade balance and thus eliminating 
the required capital and US investors turned to the stock market and broker lending  signaling 
the start of the stock boom. 
 
 In the next section, this paper will prove the hypothesis; it will be clear that for the 
Great Recession will be much easier to prove it because the literature of the Basco’s model was 
inspired by the Great Recession and the Dotcom Bubble. The challenge will be trying to prove 
the idea in the Great Depression. If proven correctly, we can infer that the IMFS type will have 
an impact on the formation of financial crisis and thus the best course of action is at least 
creating capital controls (This paper is not defending autarkic ideas but to defend some 
international coordination to avoid excess capital inflow towards a set of countries). 
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE OLG MODEL 
 
To try to prove the point first, we must define what to prove, in this chapter we will 
try to show the following ideas from the previous section: 
 
5.1.The idea of the Global Saving Glut for both period and the symptoms of it. 
5.2.The idea that capital movement from financially underdeveloped countries is 
inelastic and independent from the financially developed country, the idea is that 
capital is expelled by the home country rather attracted by the foreign country. 
5.3.The idea that foreign capital can create asset bubbles 
 
The idea of the Global Saving Glut and the Symptoms empirical view  
 
The similarities between both Grand Financial Crises are evident according to the 
empirical data, both experienced a prior asset boom that led to a collapse of the international 
lending and a banking crisis at the domestic level at certain countries. From 2001 through 2008, 
one half of Europe and the United States received enormous amounts of capital inflow from 
the other half of Europe and the rest of the world. From 1924 through 1928, one half of Europe 
received massive capital inflow from the other half and the rest of the world.  
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The tales of the Great Depression and the Great Recession can be summarized as follows, the 
lack of international cooperation and the free movement of capital (both depends on the 
international monetary and financial system IMFS) lead to increase current account imbalances 
between countries, those that have current account surpluses exported capital to the deficit 
countries, the desired savings of the countries with current account surpluses exceeds during a 
large period the investment desired, therefore in a free movement of capital environment the 
saving glut is transferred to the international lending market. Consequently, interest rates fall, 
and it will create a higher demand on assets that can be collateralized (eg. House, stock). 
 
In the 1920’s, numerous countries in central and easter Europe and among non-
European primary producers a persistent imbalance on the current account existed. The United 
States at the time was by far the most important surplus nation, both in trade and current account 
The deficit was sustained by the influx of international investment, above all the United States 
and to a limited extent the UK, France, and others. 
 
In contrast to the 2000’s, the United States was by far the country with the largest 
current account deficit in gross term, moreover, some Southern Europeans countries had 
significant current account deficits in relative terms. At the time China, Central Europeans 
Countries and significant part of the non-European primary producers sustained the current 
account deficit of the first group.  
Figure 13: Current Account Across the Great Crises 
 
Current Account Across the Great Crises. Data Font:http://www.macrohistory.net/data/ Source:Own made. 
 Blue:Germany,Belgium and Portugal. (Great Depression) 
Red: Portugal,Italy,Ireland,Greece,Spain and US.(Great Recession) 
This graph is centered at the year that the crisis began; so, for the red line it would be 2008 and the red line 1929 
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If the hypothesis of the GSG and the Basco’s model be true, we will observe that interest 
rates must fall during the formation of the bubble. Prior to the bubble burst, we must observe 
that interest rates should increase and therefore the bubbles disappear. For that we will use the 
data of the US-Germany from 1924 to 1935, US-Germany from 1998-2010. 
 
Figure 14: Interest rates comparison 
 
Interest rates comparison. Data Font:http://www.macrohistory.net/data/ Source:Own made. 
Red:Germany              Blue:United States  
 
As we can see, the data looks to support the idea of Basco, interest rates at the beginning 
of the bubbles decrease in both countries (US and Germany) but the later year interest rates 
rose in both cases. 
 
 The interest rate in the early 1920 in the US, was 7.74%, by 1926 was 4.06%, since 
1926 it started to increase when it peaked in 1929 with 7.61%. The Florida Housing 
Bubble started in 1920 and it burst in 1926, later the Stock market rally started in 1927 
and burst in 1929 (see figure 15). Approximately following the pattern predicted by 
Basco's work. In Germany from 1924 to 1929 experienced a price boom on the housing 
market almost doubling the price (see figure 16). By 1924, the interest rate was 11.11%, 
in 1926 it bottomed at 6.03% but from 1927 to 1929, interest rates increased and peaked 
in 1929 with 8.27%. 
 
 The same story can be told in the housing bubble, in the early 2000 interest rate in the 
US and Germany started to decrease, however by 2005 the interest rates of both 
countries started to increase. In 2007, the subprime crisis started in the US just when 
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interest rates peaked. In Germany and Europe, it peaked in 2008, when the housing 
bubbles in some European countries peaked. (see figure 16) 
 
One interesting pattern we can observe is that the surplus countries tend not to have housing 
bubbles, in the deficit countries do. (See figure 16), however the same relationship cannot apply 
to the stock market. 
Figure 15: Comparison  
 
 
 Red:Germany              Blue:United States  
 
Figure 16: Comparison  
 
 
Housing Index in the 1920’s; red-Germany, blue-France, Green-UK, Yellow-USA 
Housing Index in the 2000’s; red-Germany, blue-Japan, Green-Spain, Yellow-USA 
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The idea that capital is expelled by the financial underdeveloped country rather 
attracted by the financially developed countries 
 
 The are many literatures that tries to explain the factors of attraction of foreign capital, 
the most prominent one is the Push-Pull Analysis. The push pull analysis tries to measure 
which factor is the most important when capital move across borders. The Push factor is 
defined as “variables” that encourages to move capital to another countries. This factor is more 
related to the conditions of the country of origin (the lender). Meanwhile, the Pull factor is 
defined as conditions from the borrowing countries that attracts capital. 
 
 The idea is that to confirm the paper’s hypothesis, the Push factor should be more 
“significant” than the Pull factor. The reason is that the Basco’s model assumes that there are 
countries that are financially underdeveloped and thus cannot provide meaningful investment 
to the savers, so the capital owners are “forced” to search opportunities in the international 
market. The constraint faced by the capital holders in the model is not defined but we can 
interpret as the Push factor, savers are not able to invest at home, so they are “pushed” away 
from the home country. 
 
 The reality is that many studies prove that the “push” factor is the dominant factor in 
the roaring 20’s and the Great Moderation (the periods prior the Grand Crises). Thus, proving 
this paper idea. Eichengreen and Accomiotti (2013) proved in the “The Mother of all sudden 
stops: Capital flow reversal in Europe,1919-1932” that the pull factor cannot account for the 
surge and sudden stop in capital flow, but the push factor was significant drivers of capital in 
the 1920’s 
 
Eichengreen and Accomiotti (2013) did the following regression lines to explain the 
main drivers of capital. 
 
For the “Pull” factor, they had the dependent variable the (log of the) total amount 
borrowed by a given country each year. The explanatory variables are the economic size (Real 
GDP), economic development (lagged GDP per capita), economic performance (lagged Real 
GDP growth), inflation rate (lagged), public debt to fiscal revenue, government budget balance 
to revenue, international reserves to imports, dummy Gold Standard, Primary exporter 
(Dummy variable) , dummy League of Nation ( if the country has the assist of the League of 
 50 
Nation to get foreign capital, as noted by Ritschl (2002), countries like Germany  enjoyed  
“transfer protection mechanism24” that incentivized investments) and finally since Germany 
was the main borrower to the period, two dummies variables are also included the model, the 
first dummy is to try to capture the effect of the Dawes Plan in Germany (1924-1928) and the 
second is to capture the effect of Young Plan in Germany (1929-1932). 
 
Model 2: Pull Factor OLS (1924-1934) 
 
 
The first observation of the result is that the goodness of fit (R2) of the OLS is quite 
low, which usually indicates that the model does not explain much of the dependent variable. 
 
The second observation is that for the period of 1924-28, the size of the economy, the 
reserves and being exporter of primary goods is significant however the second period 1929-
 
24 Transfer protection mechanism gave commercial credits first claim rights to the foreign capital 
available in the invested country.  
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1932 none of the variables is significant. Furthermore, there are variables that looks like that 
they have different sign for instance countries that were more developed in terms of GDP per 
capital in the first period apparently tended to have less gross capital inflow than countries that 
were less developed (it also happens with grow rates). The most significant changes are with 
the Reserve, countries that tend to have large reserves of foreign currencies or gold tend to have 
less gross capital flow than countries that had less in the first period, but in the second the 
reverse occurs. The most obvious answer of this is an historical one, with the 1929 crack and 
the panic that ensued investors decapitalized investments from foreign countries to take their 
savings/capitals back and thus expanding the crisis, but another reading of the results can be 
made, the interpretation is focused in the first period, the idea goes as follow, countries with 
larger capital accumulation exported capital abroad because there were no “good-enough” 
investment on their home country and thus exporting more capital towards countries with much 
smaller reserves. If this interpretation is correct, then the idea of the Global Saving Glut and 
the Basco’s model will be useful to explain, not only the Great Depression but every financial 
depression that the international capital had a role. 
 
For the pull factor regression, the focus of the dependent variable is how much money 
did the financial capital exported to the receptors, for that, a proxy variable was chosen, (the 
log of) the total volume of total bonds of a given financial center each year. The first variable 
is the perception of risk, so the long interest rate was chosen as a proxy variable, then volatility 
of the stock as a measure of the perception of risk of the equity market, Real GDP (log terms) 
and finally 2 control variables for the European level, which is GDP growth and Trade 
Openness. 
 
Four different regression lines are created, the first one is a simple Pool OLS, the second 
one is a Pool OLS with time dummies, the third is a Fixed Effect Model and finally, the fourth 









Model 3: Push Factor OLS (1924-1932) 
 
 
As we can see, the model of pull factor from Accominotti and Eichengreen, very few 
variables are significant with the traditional level of confidence (1%,5% and 10%), furthermore 
the adjusted goodness of fit is quite low, between 0.23 (at best) and 0.16 (at best). In contrast 
the push factor seems more explanatory, we have that the volatility and the long-term interest 
rates (proxy variable of the investor’s expectation) are significant with all the confidence levels. 
The adjusted goodness of fit is quite high between 0.62 to 0.69 and thus indicating that the 
Push factor was more significant than the pull factor. 
 
The conclusion we can get is that during the roaring 1920’s the factor of attraction of 
capital was mainly due to the expulsion of capital from countries with trade surplus. This result 
shows that the Basco’s model is correct because countries with trade surplus, and thus capital 
surplus, is unable to transform all the savings into domestic investment, there are significant 
chunk of capital that is “expulsed” from the system to invest to other countries with more 
investment opportunities. 
 
For the period of the Great Moderation (2000-2009), this paper tried to recreate the 
regression lines of the Accominotti & Eichengreen (2013) work.  
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For the pull factor model, this paper uses portfolio inflow variable25 as the dependent 
variable (it will be a proxy of the bond issuing of the original work), we exclude the variables 
Gold Standard, Germany, Primary Exporter and League of Nations because we consider that 
this paper will be “useless”. The reason is simple, the Gold Standard did not exist anymore, 
Germany was no longer a borrower, all the countries are developed countries and the share of 
raw materials is relatively small in all the countries and finally these countries did not receive 
assistance from the League of Nations (United Nations in this case). 
 
 We also lagged (First degree) all the explanatory variables, except Ln Real GDP. So, 
the model is as follows: 
 
Model 5: Pull Factor OLS (2000-2010) 
 
 
The results of the regression line show that for the overall period, the proportion of the 
variance in the dependent variables that is predicted from the independent variables is quite 
low, around 0.37. Not many variables are significant in all confidence levels. However, if we 
divide the periods, it seems that it performs much better but further studies is needed to 
determine if the model is truly unbiased and efficient. 
 
25 The variables are from the World Bank data base and it describes all the equity and financial asset 
purchased by foreigners. 
